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NOTES
similar to the Federal practice. Minnesota provides for the grant-
ing or refusal of requests before argument and allows counsel to
read the approved requests to the jury in their argument. 1 2 The
charge then comes at the conclusion of the argument. The purpose
of this provision is to enable litigants to have the applicable prin-
ciples of law discussed by counsel in their final argument." The
benefit to litigants of having such applicable principles of law dis-
cussed by counsel in final argument is not to be underestimated."
Florida has a statute similar in effect to Minnesota.33 Statutes in
Ohio and Wyoming require the giving of requested instructions
before argument and the general charge after." It has there been
held that such requested instructions must be given before argu-
ment and the defect cannot be cured by giving them in the general
charge after argument.-
7
It would seem that there is considerable to be said for the
argument that counsel has a right either to have the instructions
givern before argument or to know what the instructions will be
when given. The argument that the last voice the jury is to hear
before retiring should be that of the judge calmly restoring them to
the main elements of the controversy and the law which they are
to use as a guide to their verdict, is likewise of great force. While
these two statements seem beyond reconciliation it is to be noted
that it is not impossible to combine much of the better arguments
on either side into a single, workable rule.
ROBERT H. LUNDBERG.
VENDOR AND PURCHASER - RECORDS - EFFECT OF ERROR BY
RECORDING OFFICER. - One of the most difficult problems faced by
the law arises when one of two innocent parties must bear a loss
occasioned by the act of a third party. This situation is presented to
a court when a party acquiring an interest in property presents his
instrument of title to a recording officer and receives it back be-
lieving in good faith that it has been recorded in compliance with
the law only to discover later that as the result of an error by the
recording officer another party has acquired an interest in the same
property without having been able reasonably to discover the inter-
32. Minn. Stat. § 546.14 (1945).
33. Lataurelle v. Horan, 212 Minn. 520, 4 N.W.2d 343 (1942).
34. Zickrick v. Strathern, 211 Minn. 329, 1 N.W.2d 134 (1941).
35. Fla. Stat. § 918.10 (1951).
36. Ohio Gen. Code § 11447 (Page's, 1926); Wyo. Comp. Stat. § 3-2408 (1945).
37. Industrial Comm. v. Austin, 51 Ohio App. 469, 1 N.E.2d 649 (1935).
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est of the first party. Due to the financial status of many recording
officers, the amount of their surety bonds and the applicable
statutes of limitation, which matters will be discussed subsequently,
legal a'ction between the two innocent parties often results.'
For purposes of simplification the types of error encountered
will be classified in two general groups: errors in enrolling instru-
ments at length upon the record books and errors of indexing.
ERRORS OF ENROLLMENT
The recording statutes generally change the common law rule
that a conveyance prior in time is prior in right and make convey-
ances void as to subsequent purchasers in good faith for valuable
consideration and without notice unless the conveyance has been
recorded in compliance with the terms of the applicable statute, 2
and the record is made constructive notice of the conveyance re-
corded.3
In a large number of the reported cases courts have based
their decisions on interpretations of certain individual sections of
their recording acts,4 but variations in wording or detail of
mechanics in statutes intended to bring about the same basic results
seem to be tenuous grounds at best for the variations of opinion
which have arisen. It would seem better to determine the legisla-
tive intent by viewing the recording acts as a whole and then to
reach a decision which implements that intention.'
Theories of law, both connected with and apart from sectional
statutory interpretation, have been developed by the courts that
have considered recording errors. In Frost v. Beekman,6 the earliest
reported American case, the New York cout felt that the mortgagee
was under a duty to see that the records contained the proper in-
formation as to his interests. This idea, necessarily implied in all
cases favoring a subsequent party, has been expressly mentioned in
a number of later cases.7 The opposite view, equally implied in all
cases favoring the party presenting an instrument for recording,
1. The application of the Torrens System of title registration to this situation will not
be discussed.
2. 1 Jones on Mortgages § 570 (8th Ed. 1928).
3. 1 Jones, op. cit. supra note 2, § 570.
4. In re Labb, 42 F. Supp. 542 (W.D.N.Y. 1941); General Motors Acceptance
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brackett & Shaw Co., 84 N.H. 348, 150 AtI. 739 (1930)
(vendor's lien on personal property); Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429. 24 Pac. 341 (1890).
5. Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864) (instrument not indexed).
6. 1 Johns Ch. 288 (N.Y. 1814) ($3,000 mortgage recorded as $300).
7. E.g., Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864) (failure to index mortgage); General
Motors Acceptance Corp. v. Brackett v. Shaw Co., 84 N.H. 348, 150 Atl. 739 (1930) (ven-
dor's lien on personal property); Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 24 Pac. 341 (1890).
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that -a party who has filed an instrument with the proper officer,"
for recording has done his full duty and is entitled to the protection
of the recording act, has also found favor.9 Closely allied to the
question of duty is the theory of agency. It has been mentioned
that the grantee presenting an instrument for recording does not
make the clerk his agent ° but other courts have brought out the
point that as between the grantee and the innocent purchaser the
position of the former is more like that of a principal." It is he
who has had the nearest contact with the recorder and paid him
for his services.
The contention that a defective record does not give the
notice contemplated by the statutes has been mentioned in almost
every case and discussed in a large number of them. 1' The Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania has said "The prime purpose of the law,
in providing for the recording of deeds and mortgages, is to give
notice to intending purchasers, or to others who may be interested,
that the conveyance or incumbrance stands in the line of title to the
property which it describes. The object of the recording acts is
to give notice to the world of that which is spread upon the
record.",' From this might be gleaned an additional purpose, that
of providing a source where the prospective purchaser can find
reliable evidence concerning the state of a given title. 14
Most of the recording acts contain sections providing for the
time from which constructive notice will effect others or when the
instrument will be deemed to have been recorded. A good example
of this is Section 47-1908 of the North Dakota Revised Code of
1943:
"An instrument is deemed to be recorded when, being duly
8. For discussions on proper officers see Jones v. Federal Land Bank of Columbia,
189 Ga. 419, 6 S.E.2d 52 (1939) (recording officer may employ others); Cook v. Hall,
1 Gilm. 575 (Ill. 1844) (person not appointed by recorder but asked to act for him).
9. In re Labb, 42 F.Supp. 542 (W.D.N.Y. 1941) (seller and buyer confused in index);
Cook v. Hall, 1 Gilm. 575 (I11. 1844) (original deed still in recorder's office); Guaranty
State Bank of Fort Worth v. La Hay, 98 Okla. 29, 224 Pac. 189 (1924).
10. Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss 593 (1884) (grantee had done his duty).
11. Terrel v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 (1896) (county that hired recorder was a
party to the action); Frost v. Beckmon, 1 Johns, Ch. 288 (N.Y. 1814); Jenning v. Wood, 20
Ohio 261, 267 (1851.) "... the misfortune must . . . rest on the person in whose business
and under whose control it happened;" Ritchie v. Grifliths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 241 (1890).
12. Hadfield v. Hadfield, 126 N.J.Eq. 510, 17 A.2d 169 (1941) (mortgage recorded
in book of deeds not notice); Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 Ati. 550 (1909) (mortgage
of L.J.M. enrolled and indexed as that of S.J.M. not constructive notice); Sanger v.
Craigue, 10 Vt. 555 (1838) (error in description of property).
13. Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 Atl. 550, 551 (1909).
14. Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 293 (1875); Pope v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 200 Ga. 69, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945) (error in execution of docket kept by superior
court clerk); Cilchrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576 (1878) ($5,000 mortgage recorded as $500);
Hill v. McNichol, 76 Me. 314 (1884) ($2,000 mortgage recorded as $200).
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acknowledged or proved and certified, it is deposited in the
register's office with the proper officer for record."
Statutes of this type have received two interpretations. One
group of courts hold that constructive notice starts from the time
the instrument is filed regardless of the acts or omissions of the
recording officer.15 In Thomas v. Hudson"0 this point of view was
carried to its logical conclusion. There the court, faced with two
statutes, one providing for notice from the time of filing and another
declaring that an erroneously recorded instrument would not be
notice as to bona fide subsequent parties, decided the two sections
were in irreconcilable conflict and, adopting the rule that the most
recent enactment prevails, held that a mortgage on realty recorded
in the chattel-mortgage book imparted constructive notice. Other
courts have read into statutes of this type the proviso that an in-
strument will carry constructive notice from the time of filing
providing the rest of the recording statutes are complied with.1"
While individual cases have given other reasoningis the foregoing
theories are the ones most often considered.
The following states have held statutes providing for notice
from time of filing to be conclusive against the rights of a subse-
quent purchaser of mortgagee, the party presenting an instrument
for record having done his duty when he leaves it with the record-
ing officer: Alabama,19 Arkansas,'2 0  Colorado,
21 Connecticut,=-
Georgia,'2 3 Illinois,24 Kansas,2'  Kentucky,2 6  Massachusetts,2-  Mis-
15. Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929) (recorder inserted word
"royalty" in mineral deed); Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex. 606 (1866); Bank of Marlin-
ton v. McLaughlin, 123 W.Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941) (citing prior West Virgina
cases ).
16. 190 Ga. 622, 10 S.E.2d 396 (1940).
17. E.g., Miller v. Bradford, 12 Iowa 14 (1861); Terrel v. Andrew County, 44 Mo.
309 (1896) (lien of $400 recorded as $200).
18. Terrel v. Scott, 129 Okla. 78, 262 Pac. 1071 (1927) (as between equal equities the
prior in time should prevail); Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadian-American Mortgage & Trust
Co., 36 N.D. 39, 161 N.W. 604 (1917) (where an error occurs in the records the loss
should fall on the party the recording acts were designed to protect).
19. Mims v. Mims, 35 Ala. 23 (1859) (S622 mortgage recorded as $122); Dubose v.
Young, 10 Ala. 365 (1846) (deed of trust to slave filed but not recorded within statutory
time); cf. Fouche v. Swain, 80 Ala. 151 (1855) (mortgage placed on record two weeks
after filing).
20. Rowland v. Griffin, 179 Ark. 421, 16 S.W.2d 457 (1929) (recorder inserted
word "royalty" in grant of %,s undivided mineral interest).
21. See People v. Ginn, 160 Colo. 417, 106 P.2d 479, 484 (1940) (action against
recording officer).
22. Butchers' Ice & Supply Co. v. Bascom, 109 Conn. 433, 146 AtI. 843 (1929)
(failure to record filed attachment) (citing early Connecticut cases).
23. Willie v. Hines-Yelton Lumber Co., 167 Ga. 883, 146 S.E. 901 (1929) (five
year timber lease executed in 1922 recorded as executed in 1912); Thomas v. Hudson.
190 Go. 622, 10 S.E.2d 396 (1940). But cf. Pope v. United States Fidelity & Guaranty
Co., 200 Ga. 96, 35 S.E.2d 899 (1945) (court quoted with apparent approval a statement
that parties may rely on what appears in the records where error was in execution docket
kept by the clerk of court).
24. Merrick v. Wallace, 19 I1. 486 (1858); Cook v. Hall, I Gilm. 575 (Ill. 1844)
(deed filed but never recorded).
NOTES
sissippi, -" Nebraska,*- Oklahoma,30 Oregon,3 Rhode Island,3 2 South
Dakota,3 Texas, '4 Virginia," West Virginia. 0 Since many of the
statutes dealing with personal property interests are "filing" laws
rather than "recording" laws, i. e.: the original instrument remains
on file rather than being returned to the filing party, decisions con-
cerning personal property might be considered more as indicative
of a tendency than as precedent. A large number of states have
construed the records to be notice only of what they contain. These
states are California,17 Indiana, :
'  Iowa, :' Maine,4" Maryland,4 1
25. Lee v. Bermingham, 30 Kan. 312, 1 Pac. 73 (1883) (deed filed but never
recorded); Poplin v. Mundell, 27 Kan. 138 (1882) (instrument remained on file though
not enrolled).
26. Seat v. Louisville & Jefferson County Land Co., 219 Ky. 418, 293 S.W. "986
(1927) (instrument not indexed); Cain v. Gray, 146 Ky. 438, 142 S.W. 715 (1912)
(acknowledgment not enrolled); Buckner v. Davis, 19 Ky. L.. 1349, 43 S.W. 445 (1897)
(mortgage recorded several years after filing); Bank of Kentucky v. Haggin, 8 Ky. 306
(1818).
27. See Gillespie v. Rodgers, 146 Mass. 610, 16 N.E. 711, 714 (1888) (citing many
Massachusetts cases).
28. Mangold v. Barlow, 61 Miss. 593 (1884) (recorder not agent of grantee who
files deed).
29. Perkins v. Strong, 22 Neb. 725, 36 N.W. 292 (1888) (deed listed on tract index
but not enrolled or indexed further). See Deming v. Miles, 35 Neb. 739, 53 N.W. 665
666 (1892).
30. Terrell v. Scott, 129 Okla. 78, 262 Pac. 1071 (1927) (contains reasoning that
as between equal equities the prior in time should prevail); Guaranty State Bank of
Fort Worth v. La Hay, 98 Okla. 29, 224 Pac. 189 (1924) (statute'made mortgage void
as to subsequent purchasers unless filed with the recorder); Hodges v. Simpson, 89 Okla.
80, 213 Pac. 737 (1922) (lease for $50 per annum recorded as $250); Covington v.
Fisher, 22 Okla. 207, 97 Pac. 615 (1908) (mortgage on N.W,4 indexed properly but
enrolled as upon S.W.%).
31. See Board of Commissioners v. Babcock, 5 Ore. 472 (1875) (held that index
not part of the records and reasoned that grantee had done his duty). Recording errors
are now provided for by statute in Oregon; Ore. Rev. Stat. §94.335 (1953).
32. Nichols v. Reynolds, 1 R. I. 30 (1840).
33. Shelby v. Bowden, 16 S. D. 531, 94 N.W. 416 (1903); Parrish v. Mahany, 10
S. D. 276, 73 N.W. 97 (1897) (failure to enroll). But see Citizens Bank of Parker v.
Shaw, 14 S. D. 197, 202, 84 N.W. 779, 781 (1900) "unless a party is actually misled
by an error in recording the instrument, no rights are affected by the mistake."
34. Throckmorton v. Price, 28 Tex. 605 (1866).
35. Beverley v. Ellis, 1 Rand. 102 (Va. 1822).
36. Bank of Marlinton v. McLaughlin, 123 W. Va. 608, 17 S.E.2d 213 (1941)
(citing West Virginia cases).
37. Chamberlain v. Bell, 7 Cal. 293 (1857) (purchaser can rely on what the record
shows); Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 522, 63 Pac. 844 (1901) (intrument must be en-
rolled and indexed); cf. Rice v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 629, 32 P.2d 381 (1934) (California
enacted Political Code §4135 after Cady v. Purser to make proper indexing alone sufficient
for constructive notice).
38. Baugher v. Woollen, 147 Ind. 308, 45 N.E. 94 (1896) (notice by publication
against Baugher under name "Banger" is sufficient where true spelling did not appear in
records); Gilehrist v. Gough, 63 Ind. 576 (1887) (mortgage of $5,000 enrolled as $500
and indexed as $5,000 in constructive notice of $500 mortgage since statute did not
require such information in the index).
39. Parry v. Reinerton, 208 Iowa 739, 224 N.W. 489 (1929) (incorrect index);
James v. Newman, 147 Iowa 574, 126 N.W. 781 (1910)' (failure to index); Barney v.
McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864) (failure to index); Miller v. Bradford, 12 Iowa 14 (1861).
40. Hill v. McNichol, 76 Me. 314 (1884) ( $2,000 mortgage recorded as $200);
Stedman v. Perkins, 42 Me. 130 (1856) (wrong date transcribed).
41. Brydon v. Campbell, 40 Md. 331 (1874) (deed to 4-10 of an equitable interest
enrolled as 1-14).
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Missouri,12  Michigan, A Minnesota, 44  New Hampshire,45  New
Jersey, 46  New York, 4' North Carolina,"4  Ohio,4 1 Pennsylvania, '
South Carolina," Tennessee,5 2 Vermont,;" Washington, 4 Wiscon-
sin.5
ERRORS OF INDEXING
In those jurisdictions that do not allow errors of enrollment
to impair notice the rule is the same as to errors of indexing but in
those states holding to the opposite view the additional problem
of whether the index is a part of the record is presented. This
question might be more properly stated "Is proper indexing essential
to the record?" The following courts have answered this question
42. White v. Himmelberger-Harrison Lumber Co., 240 Mo. 13, 139 S.W. .553 (1911);
Terrell v. Andrew County, 44 Mo. 309 (1869) (county employing recorder filed the lien).
43. Barnard v. Campau, 29 Mich, 162 (1874) (record of notice of levy omitted part
of premises levicd unon); cf. Sinclair v. Slawson, 44 Mich. 123, 6 N.W. 207 (1880)
(mortgagee's name in entry book but not in instrument as enrolled held sufficient for
constructive notice).
44. Bank of Ada v. Gullikson, 64 Minn. 91, 66 N.W. 331 (1896) (misdescribed
land); Thorp v. Merril, 21 Minn. 336 (1875) (error in land description); cf. Latourell
v. Hobart, 135 Minn. 109, 160 N.W. 259 (1916) (correct description in reception book
but error of enrollment held sufficient for constructive notice).
45. Pittsburgh Plate Glass Co. v. American Crystal, Inc., 91 N.H. 102, 13 A.2d 721
(1940) (failure to record special attachment); General Motors Acceptance Corp. v.
Brackett & Shaw Co., 84 N. H. 348, 150 At. 739 (1930) (vendor under duty where
statute provided reserved lien must be "caused" by vendor to be "recorded").
46. Hadfield v. Hadfield, 126 N. J. Eq. 510, 17 A.2d 169 (1941) (mortgage enrolled
in book of deeds).
47. Frost v. Beekman, I Johns. Ch. 288 (N. Y. 1844); cf. Manhattan Co. v. Laim-
beer, 108 N. Y. 578, 15 N.E. 712 (1888) (failure by recorder to enroll limited partnership
agreement did not make them general partners as to creditors). But cf. In re Labb, 42
F.Supp. 642 (W.D. N. Y. 1941) (error of indexing); Dodds v. O'Brien, 166 N. Y.Supp.
1065 (1917) (grantee has done his duty where recorder failed to index chattel mortgage).
48. Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 196 S.E. 352 (1938) (by implication in
index error case); S. R. Fowle & Son v. O'Ham, 176 N. C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918).
Contra: Eureka Lumber So. v. Satchwell, 148 N. C. 316, 62 S.E. 310 (1908) (over-
ruled by O'Ham case above).
49. Jennings v. Wood, 20 Ohio 261 (1851) (agency theory discussed); cf. Tousley
v. Tousley, 5 Ohio 78 (1855) (judgment creditor not in the position of a subsequent
purchaser).
50. Prouty v. Marshall, 225 Pa. 570, 74 Atl. 550 (1909) (discussing prior Pennsyl-
vania law); cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Camp Curtin Trust Co., 323 Pa. 431, 187 AtI. 437
(1936) (erroneous information not required in index has no bearing on notice).
51. O'Niell v. Cooper River Corp., 109 S. C. 35, 95 S.E. 124 (1918) (timber deed
extension of 10 years enrolled as 3 years).
52. Southern Building and Loan Assoc. v. Rodgers, 104 Tenn. 439, 58 S.W. 234
(1900) (record with defective description not notice after mortgage withdrawn). Cf.
Wilkins v. Reed, 156 Tenn. 321, 300 S.W. 588 (1927) .(error must be of a type that
could not reasonably be discovered).
53. Sawyer v. Adams, 8 Vt. 172 (1863) (deed enrolled on fly leaf of old record
book and not indexed); Sanger v. Craigue, 10 Vt. 555 (1838) (deed to one lot enrolled
as to another).
54. Ritchie v. Griffiths, I Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 341 (1890) (failure to index).
55. Pringle v. Dunn, 37 Wis. 449 (1875) (error affecting recordability destroys
constructive notice if information not supplied elsewhere in records). Cf. Shove v. Larson,
22 Wis. (1867) (error of enrollment with correct information furnished in index sufficient
for notice).
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in the affirmative: California,"; Iowa 'T North Carolina, " Pennsyl-
vania,"5 and Washington. ' The view taken by other courts is that
their statutes, generally similar to those of the previously mentioned
states, do not make the index a part of the record but just an aid to
the searcher.61
The North Dakota decisions on the point of who shall suffer
for the recording officer's error appear to favor the party filing for
record. The earliest case found is that of Red River Lumber Co. v.
Children of Israel."'" The court held that the failure of the clerk to
perform his duties under the statutes relating to mechanic's liens
would not defeat the lien of a party who had submitted the lien
for recording. However there was no bona fide subsequent pur-
chaser or incumbrancer as a party to that case. If there had been
Chief Justice Corliss said "It might be that the plaintiff would be
estopped from setting up the lien as against such purchaser or
incumbrancer." '  In a later case " action was brought by a subse-
quent purchaser against the register of deeds for failure to put a
mortgage on the tract index. The mortgagor had prevailed in the
lower court on foreclosure but it does not appear that the fore-
closure proceedings were ever appealed from so it is impossible to
tell just what the facts in that case were. At any event doubt has
been expressed that information in the tract index will give con-
structive notice.'" The most important North Dakota case is that
of Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadian-American Mortgage & Trust Co.""
In that case the plaintiff had filed a mechanics lien against the
N.W34 of a certain section. Later, discovering a mistake, they filed
56. Cady v. Purser, 131 Cal. 552, 63 Pac. 844 (1901) (both correct enrollment and
indexing necessary). Cf. Rice v. Taylor, 220 Cal. 629, 32 P.2d 381 (1934) (Section
4135 of Cal. Pol. Code enacted to make proper indexing alone constructive notice).
57. Parry v. Reinertson, 208 Iowa 739, 224 N.W. 489 (1929) (failure to properly
index a mortgage); Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864) (contains discussion of prac-
tical considerations ).
58. Dorman v. Goodman, 213 N. C. 406, 196 S.E. 352 (1938) (index must contain
sufficient information to put a prudent searcher on his guard); S. R. Fowle & Son v. O'Han,
176 N. C. 12, 96 S.E. 639 (1918); Dewey v. 9ugg, 109 N. C. 328, 13 S.E. 923 (1891)
(proper index essential to creation of judgment lien). Contra: Eureka Lumber Co. v.
Satchwell, 148 N. C. 316, 62 S.E. 310 (1908) (overruled by O'Ham case above).
59. See Speer v. Evans, 47 Pa. St. 141, 144 (1864). Cf. Gulf Refining Co. v. Camp
Curtin Trust Co., 223 Pa. 431, 187 Atl. 437 (1936) (erroneous information not required
by statute has no bearing on notice).
60. Ritchie v. Griffiths, 1 Wash. 429, 25 Pac. 341 (1890) (thorough discussion).
61. E.g., Mutual Life Insurance of New York v. Drake, 87 N. Y. 257 (1881); Green
v. Garrington, 16 Ohio St. 549, (1866) (the index points to the record); Armstrong v.
Austin, 45 S. C. 69, 22 S.E. 763 (1895); Curtis v. Lyman, 24 Vt. 337 (1852).
62. 7 N. D. 46, 73 N.W. 203 (1897).
63. Red River Lumber Co. v. Children of Israel, 7 N. D. 46, 50, 73 N.W. 203,
204 (1897).
64. Rising v. Dickinson,'18 N. D. 478, 121 N.W. 616 (1909).
65. Maxwell, The Tract Index and Notice in North Dakota, 25 N. D. Bar Briefs 176
(1949).
66. 36 N. D. 39, 161 N.W. 604 (1917).
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a new lien against the S.3 of the S.W.L' and the S.32 of the S.E.3, at
the same time filing a satisfaction of the former lien. The clerk of
court erroneously noted this satisfaction in the margin of the cor-
rected lien as if it were satisfied. In the action between the plain-
tiff so filing and subsequent lien holders the court found for the
plaintiff on two grounds; (1) "The consequences of the failure of
a recording officer to perform his statutory duties with precision
and accuracy should be visited rather on those in whose interests
the statutes are enacted than upon those who have in all ways
complied with the statutes requiring the filing of instruments for
record."117 (2) "Had the subsequent encumbrancers in the case
before us examined the contents of the satisfaction filed with the
clerk of the district court they could have been in no way misled
by the entry on the record.""'  The second ground seems more
likely to have been the true basis for the decision and is well
supported by decisions in other jurisdictions. The best examples
of the proposition that a mistake must be of such a nature that a
prudent searcher would be unable to discover the true state of
title if the party filing the instrument is to bear the burden of it
are two cases decided by the Supreme Court of Iowa at the same
term of court."' In Barney v. McCarty the mortgage was never in-
dexed and the court found that the record did not give notice. In
Barney v. Little the index gave the wrong page reference to a
mortgage but since the page number of the mortgage in question
was out of sequence with the rest of the page numbers in that
section of the index and the searcher, on looking for the mortgage
on the page given, would have found a different instrument, the
court ruled that the error was of a type that could have reasonably
been discovered and so was not the type to prevent the giving of
notice. This reasoning was obviously followed by the North Dakota
court in the Atlas case.
In McHugh v. Haley7° the question of the clerk's failure to note
an easement on the tract index was briefed by counsel but the case
was decided on other grounds. However a discussion of the point
in that case by Justice Birdzell, who also wrote the opinion in the
Atlas case, indicates that the court did not feel the question of who
should suffer for a recorder's error generally had been settled by
67. Atlas Lumber Co. v. Canadan-American Mortgage & Trust Co., 36 N. D. 39, 42-43,
161 N.W. 604, 605 (1917).
68. Id. at 43, 161 N.W. at 605.
69. Barney v. Little, 15 Iowa 527 (1864); Barney v. McCarty, 15 Iowa 510 (1864).
70. 61 N. D. 359, 237 N.W. 835 (1931).
NOTES
the previous case.7 A future presentation of the general problem
might possibly be decided either way as the discussion for the first
ground for the decision in the Atlas case could conceivably be
considered dicta. Insofar as mortgages of personal property are
concerned there can be little question of the effect of a recorder's
error in North Dakota. Section 35-0413 of the North Dakota Re-
vised Code of 1943 provides in part as follows: "The negligence of
the officer with whom the mortgage is filed shall not prejudice the
rights of the mortgagee."
LIABILITY OF RECORDING OFFICER
"The register of deeds is a ministerial officer, and as such is
answerable in damages for nonfeasance, misfeasance or malfeas-
ance." 7 It is plain that the identity of the party to whom the re-
corder is liable in damages depends upon the rule of the jurisdiction
as to which of two innocent parties must bear the loss. The cases
have been so decided without express reference to such rules. The
recorder need-not, at his peril, rule upon the validity of an instru-
ment presented to him as he is a ministerial officer and cannot
arbitrarily refuse to record an instrument in proper form eligible
for record.
7
The main point of disagreement among the various courts lies
in their interpretations of the applicable statutes of limitations, the
question being, "When does the statute begin to run?" North
Dakota has decided that the statute begins to run when the faulty
entry is made.7 4 In Rising v. Dickinson,'5 where the plaintiff had
purchased property from a party who had already mortgaged the
same property under an erroneously recorded instrument, the re-
cording officer prevailed due to the plaintiff's failure to show that
his grantee could not pay on her warranty. The position that the
statute of limitations begins to run when the injury occurs has,
however, been ably defended in other jurisdictions.71
Registers of deeds are not generally more affluent than other
public servants so North Dakota is fortunate in that the legislature
has required them to be bonded in an amount more realistic than
is provided in most other states. The North Dakota statutes pro-
vide for either $10,000 or $15,000 surety bonds depending on the
size of the county served. 77  ROBERT N. OPLAND.
71. McHugh v. Haley, 61 N. D. 359, 372-373, 237 N.W. 835, 840 (1931).
72. Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 481, 121 N.W. 616, 617 (1909).
73. Weyrauch v. Johnson, 201 Iowa 1197, 208 N.W. 706 (1926).
74. Farmer's Bank of Garrison v. Raugust, 42 N. D. 503, 173 N.W. 793 (1919).
75. Rising v. Dickinson, 18 N. D. 478, 121 N.W. 616 (1909).
76. See Betts v. Norris, 21 Me. 314, 324 (1842) (dissenting opinion).
77. N. D. Rev. Code §11-1006 (1943).
